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When a Uniform Act, such as the Uniform Foreign-Money
Claims Act ("the Act"),1 is undertaken by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws2 and involves a considerable
change in prior law, those drafting the Act are obliged to ask and an-
swer many questions.' This Article will describe the questions asked of
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I UrIF. FOREIGN-MONEY CLAIMs ACr 13 U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 1990) [hereinafter
the Act].
* Commissioners from each state are appointed by the respective Governors. The
Commissioners meet yearly at a national conference. Proposals for new uniform laws
are considered first by the Scope and Program Committee of the Conference. If a pro-
posal is approved, that approval is reviewed by the Executive Committee which can
recommend that the Chairman appoint either a study committee or a drafting commit-
tee. At the Annual Meeting in the summer of 1987, the Executive Committee recom-
mended that the Chairman appoint a drafting committee to work on the proposed Act.
Chairman Michael Sullivan of Minnesota, appointed the following:
Howard T. Rosen, Esq. - New Jersey - Chairman
Patricia Sommer, Esq. - Oklahoma - Drafting Liason
(who resigned before completion of the drafting)
John A. Chanin, Esq. - Hawaii
M. Michael Cramer, Esq. - Maryland
David T. Prosser, Jr., Esq. - Wisconsin
Thomas H. Sponsler, Esq. - Louisiana
Additionally, Chairman Sullivan appointed the following Review Committee:
Jeremiah Marsh, Esq. - Illinois - Chairman
Morey M. Myers, Esq. - Pennsylvania
Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., Esq. - West Virginia
3 This can be appreciated by briefly reviewing the history of the drafting. The
Drafting Committee and its advisors* met twice after its appointment and presented a
third draft for a first reading at the 1988 Annual Meeting of the Commissioners. In
December 1988, the Drafting Committee considered a fourth tentative draft in the light
of the comments made at the Annual Meeting in the summer of 1988. A fifth draft was
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and answered by this Act. It will do so by following the questions,
advice, and remarks Lord Coke set out in Heydon's Case:
4
[F]or the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in gen-
eral .... four things are to be discerned and considered:
1st. What was the common law before the making of
the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the
common law did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and
appointed to cure the disease [i.e. mischief]....
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the
[courts shall construe the statute to] .... suppress the
mischief, and advance the remedy.5
1. THE MISCHIEF
In response to Lord Coke's second question, the mischief to be
remedied is the tendency of the common law approach to foreign-
money claims either to overcompensate or undercompensate an ag-
grieved party.
The Anglo-American law governing litigation of an obligation ex-
pressed or incurred in a money other than that of the country in which
the court sits has produced results far different from those reached
under other legal systems. Foreign-money claims have been treated dif-
ferently under the laws of our trading partners in Europe, Asia, Africa,
and South America. The civil law countries, when faced with a claim
expressed in a foreign money, have entered judgments in one of two
ways. Some have entered judgment for a specific amount of the foreign
currency without more,' while others added an option for payment of
studied in February 1989 and a sixth draft was prepared for the next annual meeting
in Kauai, Hawaii. At that meeting, held in August 1989, the Act, with some changes,
was approved. The vote by the states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico yielded
50 "aye" and 2 abstentions. Subsequently, in accordance with Conference procedure,
the Style Committee reviewed the Act and clarified its wording. Thus far, Connecticut
is the only state that has adopted the Act. 13 U.L.A. (Supp. 1990). * The advisors and
the organizations they represented were: Barry Belier, Esq., Chairman, American Bar
Association Committee on International Financial Transactions of the Section on Inter-
national Law and Practice; Henry Harfield, Esq., Council on International Banking;
Norman Nelson, Esq., New York Clearing House Association; and Somerset R. Wa-
ters, III, Society of International Treasurers.
" Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. Ch. 1584).
5 Id. at 638 (citations omitted).
6 F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 339 (4th ed. 1982) [hereinafter
MANN].
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the judgment with an equivalent amount of the money of the forum
rendering the judgment. Under the latter option, the day of payment is
the conversion date used in civil law countries.' This is sometimes re-
ferred to as the "payment day rule."
Unlike civil law countries, Anglo-American common law has been
interpreted to require a court to conduct its business in the money of
the forum.' Indeed, for some years it was believed that a federal statute
of 1792 required this procedure in the United States.9 As Professor
Ronald Brand noted in his seminal article on foreign-money obliga-
tions, eighteen states statutorily required that legal proceedings be ex-
pressed in United States dollars.1" Thus, two rules evolved under which
foreign-money claims were litigated. Under the breach day rule, foreign
moneys were converted to the local money of the forum based on either
the day that the contract required that payment be made or the day
that the tort was committed. Under the judgment day rule, enunciated
by Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Deutsche Bank v.
Humphrey," where foreign law governed, the foreign money was con-
verted into United States dollars on the judgment day. 2
The breach day rule was followed in the majority of the Anglo-
American jurisdictions. As recently as 1960, the House of Lords, in In
re United Railways of the Havana and Regla Warehouses, Ltd.,'$ re-
garded the breach day rule as one of long standing. The case involved
recovery by United States investors for money furnished through a
Pennsylvania trustee for the purchase of railway rolling stock for a Cu-
7 Id. at 340.
' Although this is still followed in some common law jurisdictions, England aban-
doned this view about ten years ago.
' See RE STATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
823 reporter's note 1 (Tent. Draft 1985). Note that the requirement that "[tlhe money
of account of the United States shall be expressed in dollars... and all proceedings in
the courts shall be kept and had in conformity to this regulation," contained in § 20 of
the Coinage Act of 1792, was eliminated in the 1982 Revision of that act. See also
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CrrY OF NEw YORK, REPORT OF THE CoMIrr-
TEE ON FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, Foreign Currency Judgments 41 REc.
A.B. Crry N.Y. 335, 337 (1986).
10 Brand, Restructuring the U.S. Approach to Judgments on Foreign Currency
Liabilities: Building on the English Experience, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 139, 169 &
n.166 (1985). The states are Arkansas, California, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
1- 272 U.S. 517 (1926). The judgment was never enforced as the claimant re-
ceived more in United States dollars from the United States Foreign-Claims Commis-
sion's settlement fund than was awarded by the decision. Justice Holmes can be read as
referring to the date of the institution of legal proceedings, but most cite the opinion for
the judgment day rule.
12 Id. at 519.
" 1961 App. Cas. 1007 (1960).
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ban railway that was expropriated by the Cuban government without
adequate compensation. The House of Lords concluded that Pennsylva-
nia law was applicable, but applied English law to determine the con-
version date of the United States dollars involved into pounds sterling.
Professor Goode of London University describes the breach day rule as
a "procedural rule," characterizing its logic as "far from self-evident,"
and states that "it was recognised as capable of causing great injustice
to the creditor, whose contractual right to a given number of units in a
foreign money... was arbitrarily converted by a rule of procedure into
a claim for sterling that might well depreciate" prior to payment. 14 As
shown in Part II, the English courts now apply a "payment day"
rule.15
In Competex v. Labow,'8 the creditor fared in a piratical fashion
upon the application of the "breach day" rule by a New York federal
court. A New Yorker named Labow went to London and lost heavily
trading on the London Metals Exchange. Labow's London brokers
paid the losses, sued him in an English court, and obtained a judgment
for 187,900 pounds sterling. As Labow had no assets in England, a suit
on the English judgment was brought in New York. The original New
York judgment was entered for $443,380. After judgment was rendered
in New York, Labow paid the English judgment in pounds in London.
Since the case had been brought to enforce the English judgment,
Labow made a post-judgment motion to dismiss on the ground that
there was no longer an unpaid English judgment to enforce."
The post-judgment motion, to the effect that payment in England
left the United States federal court with nothing to enforce, save inter-
est and costs and the awarded attorney's fees, was denied." The Second
Circuit 9 affirmed the judgments below, thus refusing to dismiss the
action. However, it did credit the New York judgment for the dollars
used to procure the English pounds sterling which were used to pay the
English judgment.20
Other examples of overcompensation or undercompensation
14 R. M. GOODE, PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS IN COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 136 (1983) [hereinafter GOODE].
15 Id. at 136-37. See also infra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
16 783 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1986), affg 613 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
17 613 F. Supp. at 335.
18 Id.
19 See Competex, 783 F.2d at 337. The court felt obliged to follow New York law,
but expressed a preference for a payment day rule: "If we were free to choose a conver-
sion rule, we would select either the judgment-day or the payment-day rule." Id. at
339.
30 Id.
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abound.2 It would not be realistic to state that adoption of the judg-
ment day rule22 would altogether cure the mischief occasioned by con-
version of the judgment to local currency before actual payment is
made. The time-lag between breach day, or the date of the commission
of a tort, and the day of judgment may, on the average, be longer than
the time between a trial court's initial judgment and a payment made
after remand from an appellate court. Yet the "mischief" of either over-
compensation or undercompensation to the foreign-money claimant can
be large in either time frame. Strangely, much of the discussion on the
subject is couched in terms of preventing windfalls to one party or an-
other.2" The windfall analysis may result from an unconscious applica-
tion of the approach to domestic money transactions under what is
called the universal principle of nominalism, 4 expressed by Lord Jus-
tice Denning as follows:
A man who stipulates for a pound [sterling] must take a
pound when payment is made, whatever a pound is worth at
that time. Sterling is the constant unit of value by which in
the eye of the law everything else is measured. Prices of
commodities may go up or down, other currencies may go up
and down, but sterling remains the same.
2 5
I See Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Nisbet Shipping Co., [1962] 2 Q.B. 330, a subroga-
tion case brought in Canada by an insurance company for the repairs to a vessel in
pounds sterling. The conversion of the judgment at the breach day rate into Canadian
dollars yielded an over-recovery of 55,000 when compared with the actual expenditure
in pounds. The court awarded the excess to the owners, not the insurance company
which had sued the owners in England in order to obtain the full recovery. But see
SocietE des Hotels Le Tourquet Paris-Plage v. Cummings [1922] 1 K.B. 451 (C.A.)
(After suit was started for an amount of pounds equal in value to its worth in French
francs as of the breach date, the debtor paid the debt in France since the French franc
had fallen considerably in value as compared to the pound sterling since that date.
Permission to amend the pleadings to enter a plea of payment in full was affirmed
because the Hotel Company had accepted the payment made to one of its cashiers.).
"2 Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926), used a "judgment day"
rule. See also REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLaCT OF LAWS § 144 (1971)
(states that the "judgment day" rule is not very successful).
"I See, e.g., Librairie Hachette v. Paris Book Center, Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 873, 309
N.Y.S.2d 701 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970). The "windfall" argument exists only if there is (1)
a time gap between the conversion date and the actual payment date, and (2) a substan-
tial change in exchange rates between the two dates. Depending on which currency
falls in value, the windfall can be to either party. Compensating the claimant in the
money in which its loss was suffered eliminates the claimant's windfall, and puts the
currency fluctuation risk on the non-paying party.
"' The nominalistic principle is applied to all obligations expressed solely by ref-
erence to a domestic currency. It is said that the principle "applies across the world...
." GOODE, supra note 14, at 33, 125. The same position is taken by MANN, supra note
6, at 80-176.
" Treseder-Griffin v. Co-operative Ins. Soc. Ltd., [1956] 2 Q.B. 127, 144. De-
spite his opinion in Treseder, when, a score of years later, an arbitrator's award came
1991]
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In applying the breach day rule or the judgment day rule, courts
were in fact adopting a rather insular attitude. Even if thinking and
analysis start with the nominalistic principle that the value of domestic
money does not change internally, is it still proper to convert a claim
expressed in a foreign money to the domestic money on either the
breach day or the judgment day, when it is understood that exchange
values change? There are really two basic questions, the answers to
which will yield the proper remedy for the mischief. First, how best
may the injured party be compensated for the loss suffered? Second, do
any administrative problems exist that will prevent the entry of a judg-
ment that will comply with the answer to the first question?
To answer the first question, consider a case where a party who is
not from the United States is injured in his own country and suffers a
loss in his domestic currency, but must sue in the United States. Since
that country has its own nominalistic principle, justice seems better
served by compensating the plaintiff in his domestic currency rather
than in United States dollars. Had this been a suit filed due to an
injury caused by a local tortfeasor or wrongdoer, the courts of the
claimant's country would have had jurisdiction and the judgment would
have been granted in terms of the local currency. Should the injured
party suffer or benefit from the fluctuation in value of its own money
as compared to the money of the tortfeasor's currency just because the
foreign court was the only forum that had jurisdiction? In this exam-
ple, the wrongdoer committed the wrong in the claimant's country,
which caused the claimant to suffer damages in that currency. There-
fore, the claimant should be reimbursed in his domestic currency.
A contract case, though more complex, should yield the same re-
sult, provided that the analysis concentrates on how best to compensate
the injured party, rather than focusing on windfalls to the wrongdoer.
In this context, each party stays in his own country and the contract is
made through communications passing from one country to the other.
Assume that the seller is the injured party. If the price expressed was
to be payable in the seller's home money, or for that matter in any
currency other than the buyer's domestic currency, and the claim is for
price, the damage to the seller is the failure to obtain the specified
amount of that money at the specified time. An application of the nomi-
nalistic principle would require that the injured party be compensated
with the specified amount of the foreign money with appropriate dam-
before him expressed in a foreign currency, Lord Justice Denning affirmed the award
stating: "Things are different now. Sterling floats in the wind. It changes .... with
every gust that blows." Schorsch Meier G.m.b.H. v. Hennin, 1975 Q.B. 416, 424
(C.A.).
(Vol. 12:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss1/2
FOREIGN-MONEY CLAIMS ACT
ages for the delay in payment. Buyer's damages, too, should be calcu-
lated in terms of the money in which the particular damages were
suffered.
The answer to the second question concerning administrative diffi-
culties is that judgments can be entered in foreign moneys and executed
upon.2 6
2. THE ENGLISH REMEDY
England has demonstrated that judgments can and should be en-
tered in the currency that appropriately compensates the loss suffered.
The House of Lords took the first step to construct a remedy to the
"mischief" of overcompensation and undercompensation of injured par-
ties resulting from application of the breach day rule. In doing so, how-
ever, the House was taking a step already approved by the Court of
Appeal for arbitration cases. As Professor Goode has said:
Lord Denning stood out as a lone judicial campaigner
against what he regarded as injustice, and in his dissenting
judgment in The Teh Hu2" emphasized the unsatisfactory
nature of the rule, urging that it should not be extended to
maritime cases of salvage; and once again, it was Lord Den-
ning's heterodoxy that ultimately triumphed.28
The first and major step toward formulating the proper remedy
for injured parties was taken in Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles),
Ltd. 9 This case involved Swiss francs owed to a Swiss cloth maker.
The rate for Swiss francs had substantially increased with respect to
sterling. Thus, the pound sterling calculated at the breach day rate
would seriously undercompensate the Swiss seller when converted to
Swiss francs upon payment at or following the judgment date. Lord
Wilberforce and a majority of the House, in a holding that could have
been narrowly construed, held that prior precedent did not correctly
express the law as to debt claims for the payment of foreign money in a
case where the proper law of the case was Swiss law. As a careful
judge should, Lord Wilberforce spoke only of such a case. The House
of Lords ruled that the judgment could be entered in the foreign cur-
rency. A debtor paying voluntarily could either pay in that foreign cur-
rency or in the sterling equivalent on that day. If no voluntary payment
" Civil law countries have been doing this for a long time. See supra text accom-
panying notes 6 & 7.
27 [1970] P. 106.
", GOODE, supra note 14, at 136 (citation ommitted).
2, 1976 App. Cas. 443.
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was made, then the Swiss francs would be converted to sterling on the
date that an application was made to enforce the judgment.30 This con-
version may still undercompensate the aggrieved party when payment
is finally received, since issuing process often does not promptly result
in total payment. Lord Simons dissented with respect to the ruling that
precedent no longer correctly stated the law. His position was that the
judicial process might not result in an evaluation of all the relevant
data and issues that would be presented and evaluated in the English
legislative process. 81
The Miliangos principle did not remain limited to debt cases gov-
erned by foreign law on substantive matters for long, despite a Practice
Direction requiring substantive foreign law. 2 Again, Professor Goode
has ably summed up the course of the law: 3
Since then, the rule has been so extended that it can now be
fairly regarded as a rule of general application. It has been
held to apply to a claim for unliquidated damages for breach
of contract 4 or in tort" and to claims under contracts gov-
erned by English law where payment is to be made in for-
eign currency.3 6 In addition, certain statutory obstacles to the
SO Id. at 468.
S1 Id. at 480. When it came to whether In re United Railways of the Havana and
Regla Warehouses, [1960] 2 All E.R. 332, should be overruled, Lord Simon of Glais-
dale commented on the position of the majority:
The reasons why I cannot go along with them are closely interrelated, but
can be summarised in two sentences. First, I do not think that this is a
'law reform' which should or can properly be imposed by judges; it is, on
the contrary, essentially a decision which demands a far wider range of
review than is available to courts following our traditional and valuable
adversary system - the sort of review compassed by an inter departmental
committee. Secondly, your Lordships' predecessors have wisely set limits
on the use of the power to overrule previous decisions of your Lordships'
House; and no sufficient reason has, in my view, been shown for overrul-
ing the Havana decision.
Miliangos, 1976 App. Gas. at 480.
"I Practice Direction (Judgment: Foreign Currency), [1976] 1 W.L.R. 83 (Q.B.).
Note that paragraph 3 was modified by [1977] 1 W.L.R. 197 by removing the require-
ment that the proper law of the case must be a foreign law.
" We have taken the liberty of renumbering or consolidating Professor Goode's
footnotes to coincide with the numbers in this Article.
The Folias, 1979 App. Gas. 685 (contract).
The Despina R, 1979 App. Cas. 685 (tort); Hoffman v. Sofaer, [1982] 1
W.L.R. 1350 (Q.B.). Although not cited at this point by Professor Goode, see also
Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Levin Bros. (Bradford), Ltd., [1976] 3 All E.R. 900 (Q.B.)
(construing § 72(4) of Bills of Exchange Act). For the United States law, see U.C.C. §
3-107(2) (1987) which only applies to payments made on the due date and does not
legislate a breach day rule.
"s The Folias, 1979 App. Gas. 685. Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Levin Bros.
(Bradford), Ltd., 1977 Q.B. 270; Federal Commerce and Navigation Co., Ltd. v.
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application of the rule17 have now been removed."
Although the general rule under English law is conversion of for-
eign money claims upon application for enforcement in insolvency pro-
ceedings, the conversion is made as of the date of the winding-up order.
The conversion date in voluntary proceedings is the date of the wind-
ing-up resolution."9 Such proceedings require the earlier conversion be-
cause of the administrative necessity of computing shares.
3. A REMEDY FOR THE UNITED STATES
Against the backdrop set forth above, Lord Simon's suggestion for
reform through the legislative process should be followed in the United
States given that there are more than fifty jurisdictions. In the United
States, a uniform law is of particular interest to nationwide businesses
that are often subject to jurisdiction in many states.40 Moreover, legisla-
tion to determine the currency in which a judgment should be awarded
is desirable in light of the obstacles to judicial reform. One such obsta-
cle is the existence of state statutes requiring all court proceedings be
expressed in dollars. 41 The feeling of many that courts should not inno-
vate is another. Additionally, the current drive to increase and create
exports, coupled with the post-1985 decline and fluctuation of the dol-
lar, call for a more rapid solution than the inherently ex post facto
procedure of reform by judicial action.42
Almost all acts sponsored by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners have freedom of contract as a cardinal principle. The Uniform
Foreign-Money Claims Act is no exception, as it carefully preserves
Tradax Export, S.A., 1977 Q.B. 324.
" Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, §§ 57(2), 72(4); Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal
Enforcement) Act, 1933, § 2(3); Arbitration (Investment Disputes) Act, 1966, § 1(3);
European Communities (Enforcement of Community Judgments) Order 1972, art.
3(2).
" GOODE, supra note 14, at 137. All of the above provisions were repealed by the
Administration of Justice Act, 1977, § 4.
,, In re Dynamics Corp. of Am., [1976] 1 W.L.R. 757 (Ch. 1975); INSOLVENCY
LAw AN PRAcTcIE, Cmnd 8558 (1982) 1306-09 (insolvency); In re Lines Bros.,
Ltd., [1982] 2 All E.R. 183 (voluntary wind-up).
40 Indeed, forum shopping should be discouraged. In addition to the windfall as-
pects of forum shopping, the expense incurred by businesses in order for them to know
and prepare for costs in advance when state laws are diversified, favors a uniform
statute ending this diversity.
41 See Brand, supra note 10.
41 The confusion caused by changing established rules after parties have acted has
caused some courts instead to announce a revised rule to be effective only in the future.
The practice is called declaratory dicta. Other courts rule that a decision is not to have
retroactive effect.
1991]
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complete freedom of contract.43
The English cases have provoked some responses in other common
law jurisdictions, but most have not been judicial. The province of On-
tario in Canada has adopted a statute.4 ' The Law Reform Commission
of British Columbia has issued a Report urging the adoption of the
British remedy for the "mischief." '45 And, there has been a plethora of
legal and economic literature, 46 at least one decision in a United States
federal district court, and a recently approved Canadian proposed Uni-
form Act.
47
3.1. The Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act
The draft statute presented by the Drafting Committee and ap-
proved by the Conference adopts the British remedy48 with a few varia-
tions. It is not a long statute, nineteen sections in all, of which only
twelve are substantive, but it does reflect the complexity of several as-
pects of the problem.
4' Section 3(a) of the Act provides:
The effect of provision of this [Act] may be varied by agreement of
the parties made before or after commencement of an action or distribu-
tion proceeding or the entry of judgment.
13 U.L.A. 26 (Supp. 1990).
Section 2(a) of the Act limits the scope of the Act to a "foreign-money claim in an
action or distribution proceeding." Id. § 2(a).
All of the discussions in the following text are based on what the Act provides in
the absence of agreement otherwise.
"4 Courts of Justice Act, 1984, Ont. Stat. ch. 11, § 131(1)-(5) (1984).
'5 LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, REPORT ON FOREIGN
MONEY LIABIuTmS, LRC 65 (1983).
46 See, e.g., Bowles and Phillips, Judgments in Foreign Currencies: An Econo-
mist's View, 39 MOD. L. REv. 196 (1976); Bowles and Whelan, Law Commission
Working Paper No. 80: Private International Law: Foreign Money Liabilities, 45
MOD. L. REv. 434 (1982); Dufey & Mirus, Teaching Note No. 7 (U. of Mich. Law
School): The Theory of International Interest and Exchange Rates, (1983); Dufey &
Mirus, Teaching Note No. 12 (U. of Mich. Law School): Corporate Foreign Exchange
Risk. Assessment and Management, (1985); Knott, Foreign Judgments in Tort: An
Illustration of the Wealth-Time Continuum, 43 MOD. L. REv. 18 (1980).
47 In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978,
No. 376, part 2 of 2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file)(opinion of McGarr, J.). One other case, Chantier Naval Voisin v. M/Y Day-
break, 677 F. Supp. 1563, 1571 (S.D. Fla. 1988), while entering a judgment in French
francs, ordered immediate conversion to United States dollars. Judge McGarr did not.
He directed Standard Oil to obtain the francs and pay in francs. The authors have been
told that trial courts in Miami, Florida have entered judgments in foreign moneys,
using the foreign rates for prejudgment interest.
4 See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
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3.2. Pleading a Foreign-Money Claim
One aspect of any remedy is a determination of whether it should
be optional for a claimant to plead for a judgment in foreign money
when that is the money in which the loss was suffered. While the Brit-
ish solution, in its Practice Directive, appears to give the foreign-money
claimant the option to plead its case in sterling,4" there is no guide as to
when, if ever, the conversion to a foreign currency is made if the claim
is not asserted in the foreign money. Presumably, if state law previ-
ously applied a breach day rule and plaintiff had the option to receive
his award in a foreign currency, the plaintiff could convert that award
to the foreign currency as of that date. One can be sure that if the
dollar is rising relative to the foreign money, the claimant will revert to
the breach day rule or to the earliest date allowed in the state in order
to maximize the value of his judgment.50 If, on the other hand, the
dollar is falling with respect to the foreign money, the claimant will
plead his claim in terms of the foreign money. Giving the claimant this
option is a "heads I win, tails you lose" solution to the "mischief" of
overcompensation and undercompensation. The foreign-money claimant
will, in self-interest, take the option that gives him overcompensation
wherever possible. All drafts of the Act were based on the proposition
that the proper remuneration to the foreign-money claimant is the de-
served compensation in the money in which the loss was suffered or in
which it was agreed that payment be made; no more and no less should
be awarded. Consequently, section 4 of the Act provides that a foreign-
money claimant must plead the proper money of the claim.5" It also
provides that the defendant may contest the money asserted by the
claimant and allege and prove that a different money is the proper
money of payment or the money of account.5 2
It might be desirable to give the foreign-money claimant the option
"' The Queen's Bench Practice Directive, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 83, appears to give a
plaintiff an option, as it refers only in paragraph 13 to "Where the plaintiff desires•..
. to enforce a judgment expressed in a foreign currency. .. ." There is no provision for
a defendant to turn a case for pounds sterling into another currency.
0 The jurisdiction may have adhered to the "judgment day" rule. See, e.g., Shaw,
Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, 189 F.2d 952, 955 (2d Cir. 1951); Sirie v.
Godfrey, 196 A.D. 529, 536, 188 N.Y.S. 52, 57 (1921); 2 J.H. BEALE, A TRFATISE
ON THE CoN rIcT OF LAWS 1340-41 (1935).
"' A failure to plead does not mean that a pleading stating a dollar claim is subject
to dismissal upon motion. An issue of fact must be asserted by an opposing party be-
cause a plain dollar claim, would properly state a cause of action. Even though section
4(a) uses the permissive language "may," section 4(b) of the Act permits a third party
to raise the issue that the claim is properly a foreign-money claim. The Act § 4, 13
U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 1990).
", The Act § 6(b) and comment 2, 13 U.L.A. 28 (Supp. 1990).
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to avoid a dismissal of a complaint if a foreign-money claim is not as-
serted when it should be. A compromise in the Act permits a defendant
to plead for the foreign-money judgment, even if the plaintiff pleads in
dollars. Then, the proper money of the claim could be decided by the
court as a threshold matter if such a preliminary decision would sim-
plify the trial; otherwise, if there is a dispute over factual matters nec-
essary to the determination, it can be resolved at trial.
A foreign-money claim arises, even if the obligation is to pay a
sum in United States dollars, if the number of dollars is to be measured
by a specified number of units of a foreign money. In such a case, the
foreign money is the money of account." A judgment should be entered
for the payment of such number of dollars as would acquire the foreign
money specified when payment is made, with no option to pay in the
foreign money. Where a quantity of foreign money is specified as the
money of payment of the contract price, section 7 of the Act requires
that the specified number of monetary units in the judgment be foreign-
money units. However, at the option of the debtor, payment can be
made in the number of United States dollars that, on the conversion
date, would have purchased the specified amount of the foreign
money.i
4
3.3. The Conversion Date
The conversion date selected in the Act, for reasbns of administra-
tive convenience, is a bank-offered spot rate prevailing "at or near the
close of business" on the business day next preceding the day of actual
payment.5 5 There is only a slight restriction on the market which the
judgment debtor may use for the computation of the requisite sum of
dollars or to obtain the foreign money to pay in kind. That is, the
5S An issue of contract interpretation might arise regarding whether the parties
intended merely to shift currency fluctuation risks at the date of the maturity of the
obligation to pay notwithstanding delays in actual payment. An analogy can be found
in the law with respect to interest where the contract fixes a rate. In the field of insur-
ance, the specified rate only applies after the maturity date until payment if the context
expressly provides. See GOODE, supra note 14, at 83; see also Miller v. Reading, 369
Pa. 471, 476-77, 87 A.2d 223, 226 (1952); Ludwick v. Huntzinger, 5 Watts & Serg. 51
(Pa. 1842) (the legal rate applies after maturity when contract does not provide for
continuance).
" The form of judgment giving a payment option to the defendant merely shifts
the obligation to take dollars to the bank to be converted from the judgment debtor's
money to the judgment creditor's money. The form of judgment requires that the dol-
lars include the currency exchange commission but not a wire transfer fee unless speci-
fied by contract.
55 Currency exchange publications in the daily newspapers provide this figure on
the day of payment. Day-to-day variations are usually quite small, with the possible
exception of weekends and holidays.
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definition of "rate of exchange" limits the rate used, in the absence of
agreement otherwise, to a rate prevailing in a financial market "con-
venient to or reasonably usable by" the party obligated to pay the judg-
ment." Since the differences between the markets in New York, San
Francisco, Tokyo, Paris, Berlin, Zurich, and London, for example, are
minor and are rapidly adjusted due to arbitrage, there is no real differ-
ence between them, except, perhaps, when the largest of transactions
occurs and the parties have the option to contract for the market to be
used.
3.4. What is Foreign Money?
Foreign money is defined to exclude United States dollars but to
include measures of value such as Special Drawing Rights from the
International Monetary Fund, European Currency Units and other
composite measures of value now or hereafter created by intergovern-
mental agreements, whether or not the United States is a party to the
agreement. The existing currency composites have not yet been issued
in a form usable as legal tender. Hence, their use will be as money of
account. Note that these currency composites are considered money
under the Act, since the definition of money includes the words "or as a
store of value".57
3.5. Exceptions to a Payment Day Rule
Courts in England, as mentioned above, "8 use a conversion date
other than the payment date in two situations. The first situation arises
when an order is issued for legal enforcement of the judgment.59 The
'6 Section 1(10) of the Act reads:
"Rate of exchange" means the rate at which money of one country may be
converted into money of another country in a free financial market con-
venient to or reasonably usable by a person obligated to pay or to state a
rate of conversion. If separate rates of exchange apply to different kinds of
transactions, the term means the rate applicable to the particular transac-
tion giving rise to the foreign-money claim.
13 U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 1990).
W7 Section 1(7) of the Act reads: "'Money' means a medium of exchange for the
payment of obligations or a store of value authorized or adopted by a government or by
inter-governmental agreement." 13 U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 1990). This differs from the defi-
nition in the Uniform Commercial Code, § 1-201(24) (1987): "'Money' means a me-
dium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government as a part
of its currency."
" See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
" The English procedure for enforcement of judgments differs from that used in
United States state courts or federal courts, where the attorney for the judgment credi-
tor issues a praecipe to the sheriff at any time after judgment. The use of a certificate to
show the amount of local money required, however, is the same in both countries.
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other refers to foreign-money claims against, as the British put it, "a
company being wound-up, ' 6° in a voluntary61 or involuntary proceed-
ing.62 In section 8 of the Act it was decided that the section would
follow British precedent and use the date of the order or other action
initiating the proceeding.6" Situations other than judicial proceedings
are included in the definition of the term "distribution proceeding.""
This was done because of the necessity for providing a date early
enough to allow all claims to be evaluated in the same currency in
order to determine the percentage shares of an insufficient fund, or,
perhaps, to determine if the fund is, in fact, insufficient in the first
place and to avoid a constant recalculation of aliquot shares. If there
are several classes of distributees, a situation can develop in which a
foreign-money claimant is undercompensated in the foreign money due
to the time-lag between the conversion date in distribution proceedings
and the actual payment date. This may occur despite the fact that all
domestic money claimants are paid in full and a surplus in the fund
exists for lower priority claims.65 When this happens, the issue is
whether the administrative convenience of completing the distribution
overrides the policy in favor of full compensation for the foreign claim-
ant.6 8 The Drafting Committee, after considering this subsidiary issue,
6o GOODE, supra note 14, at 137-38.
61 The conversion date for corporate dissolutions would be that of the Director's
resolution. For both corporate and individual debtor situations, or other voluntary pro-
ceedings, the date would be that of the actual document of assignment for the benefit of
creditors.
62 This would cover state or federal equity receiverships, based on diversity of
jurisdiction, state insolvency proceedings for state banks and insurance companies, as
well as for business and non-profit corporations. A state law does not necessarily affect
federal bankruptcy proceedings or insolvency proceedings for national banks. It is ques-
tionable whether the conversion date should differ between state and national banks. If
the rule in federal courts is based on the state law "breach day" and "judgment day"
rules, then, when a state adopts the Act, a modification of the federal rule should
follow.
63 The decision was made at the December 2-4, 1988 drafting meetings and has
not been altered.
Section 1(4) of the Act defines "distribution proceeding" as:
[A] judicial or nonjudicial proceeding for the distribution of a fund in
which one or more foreign-money claims is asserted and includes an ac-
counting, an assignment for the benefit of creditors, a foreclosure, the liq-
uidation or rehabilitation of a corporation or other entity, and the distri-
bution of an estate, trust, or other fund.
13 U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 1990).
6 Again, the conversion date would have to be different, as several months to a
year could elapse between initiation of a proceeding and a final distribution. A similar
problem exists whenever damages are claimed based on an exchange loss occurring
after a conversion and before an actual payment. This matter is not covered completely
by the Act, however.
66 State law cannot control proceedings under federal statutes unless the federal
[Vol. 12:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss1/2
FOREIGN-MONEY CLAIMS ACT
decided that it should be resolved pursuant to the Commissioner's stan-
dard section on the application of supplementary general principles of
law, 7 a position taken by the Act.
In accordance with the policy against undercompensation or over-
compensation of a foreign-money claimant, the Act does not follow the
apparent British precedent of a final conversion when an order for en-
forcement of a judgment is issued. Procedure in the United States does
not call for such an order, either. For example, a praecipe for execution
is issued by the attorney for the judgment creditor and often does not
result in the receipt of any money at all. Yet, the officers carrying out
the execution process should be protected from claims for levying on or
selling too much or too little of a debtor's assets. Hence, section 11 of
the Act provides such protection by requiring an affidavit or certificate
from the appropriate counsel or bank officer stating the rate of ex-
change on the banking day before the date of the request for issuance of
process, the application for a bond, or the exchanging of costs. More-
over, the affidavit or certificate is also required to state the amount of
United States dollars which will buy the units of foreign money ex-
pressed in the judgment." Any claims for damages for seizure or re-
straining excess assets based on the amount stated in the certificate or
affidavit will lie against a person executing an affidavit or certificate in
bad faith which contains a gross overstatement of the needed amount of
dollars. 9
Another instance where foreign-money claims will be converted to
dollars at a conversion date not immediately preceding the receipt of
money is provided in section 7(g) of the Act; that is, the case of a suc-
cessful claim and a successful defense, set-off or counterclaim in the
same action, any one of which is a foreign-money claim. In this situa-
tion, the court will set-off the smaller claim against the larger one by
converting all of the claims into United States dollars at the exchange
statutes refer to state law for control of the matter. Hence, the Bankruptcy Code may
preempt the statute. Of course, where the "breach day" rule prevails, the conversion
made on that date would apply in bankruptcy.
'7 Section 13 of the Act states: "Unless displaced by particular provisions of this
[Act] the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant, and the law relative
to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating causes supplement its
provisions." 13 U.L.A. 33 (Supp. 1990).
"S Section 11 of the Act provides that the amount so stated does not control the
amount to be entered on the judgment as a payment. 13 U.L.A. 32 (Supp. 1990). A
conversion of any money received as a result of an execution sale or other process is
made as of the day before the sheriff receives the cash or its equivalent. This is consis-
tent with the Ontario Statute, supra note 44, provided that receipt of funds by a court
officer constitutes receipt by the judgment creditor.
" This follows the general principle of liability for acts done in bad faith.
1991]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
rate prevailing on the day before the set-off. Then, the court will, if
necessary, convert the remaining dollars of the larger recovery back into
the foreign money at the same rate used for the initial conversion."
Obviously, if all claims are in the same money, the set-off will be ac-
complished without a conversion.
3.6. Difficult Issues: The Approach
Two issues of great difficulty are those of incidental and conse-
quential damages and of the rates of interest to be applied for prejudg-
ment and post-judgment interest. After much consideration, the Act
leaves such matters to the rules of substantive law applicable to the
determination of damages. 1
3.6.1. Incidental and Consequential Damages
The determination of incidental and consequential damages is left
to the substantive law governing the issue, as determined by the conflict
of laws rules of the forum state. Prior drafts of the Act proposed unsat-
isfactory solutions to the question of how to calculate damage. One so-
lution, labeled "incidental damages," recommended that the fees for a
post-default forward exchange contract or option be recoverable in or-
der to preserve an exchange rate existing on or after the breach date."
A second proposed solution, also labeled "incidental damages," sug-
gested recovery of post-default interest. To prevent double recovery,
section 9(a) of the then-proposed draft provided that recovery of loan
interest under that section shall be in lieu of any recoverable prejudg-
ment interest on the amount of the loan from default to the earlier of
70 See the Act § 7(e), (g), 13 U.L.A. 29 (Supp. 1990). For example, in a suit for a
price specified to be paid in Swiss francs, the American buyer might have an indemnity
claim for warranty damages suffered in Japanese yen. Hence, a conversion of one of
the moneys to another must be made so as to permit a set-off. Id.
71 Section 9 of the Act does this specifically. 13 U.L.A. 30 (Supp. 1990). The text
of the section is set forth infra note 127. Since the Act is silent with respect to damages,
the state's conflict of laws rules apply.
" Protective arrangements made before default such as insurance or futures con-
tracts are not covered, but the costs of effecting a conversion from United States dollars
are incurred by the judgment debtor who elects to pay in the foreign money or must be
included in the amount of United States dollars if the judgment debtor elects to pay in
the home currency. See, e.g., United Equities Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 84 Misc. 2d
441, 374 N.Y.S.2d 937 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (futures contract for Japanese yen, seller
breached, buyer recovers amount it would have received on resale of yen at, or shortly
after, the delivery date less what it did receive from seller) rev'd on other grounds, 52
A.D.2d 154, 383 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1976). The ability to "hedge" for some part of the gap
between judgment and actual payment might be considered a mitigation of the
damages.
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the repayment of the loan or the entry of judgment.73 Again, the matter
was left to the states to deal with pursuant to their conflict of laws
rules.7
4
A third element of damages was labeled "consequential" and re-
lated to exchange losses incurred during the period between the breach
date and the date of judgment.7 5 The label "consequential" adds the
element of "foreseeability" to the proof needed for recovery. This raised
the issue of the proper interpretation of Hadley v. Baxendale 7 as re-
cently applied in England. Three interpretations of Hadley v. Bax-
endale are possible. The first involves a price stated in the money of
the country of the breaching party as in the case of Isaac Naylor &
Sons, Ltd. v. New Zealand Co-operative Wool Marketing Association,
Ltd. 77 In that case, the plaintiffs were sellers suing for the price of the
goods sold. The buyers were English and the price was expressed in
sterling. The court found that the buyers "knew or should have
known" that the sellers operated in New Zealand dollars, their home
currency, and that upon payment they exchanged foreign moneys into
73 Similar damage recoveries have been allowed in domestic transactions. Interest
on after-default continuation of a loan was awarded as incidental damages. Bulk Oil
(U.S.A.) v. Sun Oil Trading Co., 697 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1983). Some cases, however,
have classified such interest as consequential damages. See Larsen v. A.C. Carpenter,
Inc., 620 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (recoverable); Groppel Co., Inc. v. United
States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. App. 1981) (recoverable); Frank B. Bozzo,
Inc. v. Electric Weld of Fort Pitt Div. of Spang Indus., Inc., 498 A.2d 895 (Pa. Super.
1985) (recoverable). But see S.C. Gray, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 92 Mich. App. 789,
286 N.W.2d 34 (1974) (not recoverable).
7" Although the drafters did not believe a uniform provision was necessary, they
wanted to insure that one state would not legislate the damage rules of another.
75 A judgment does not always mean payment will be prompt. Moreover, there
are problems with carrying such a damage rule beyond the judgment. A formula could
perhaps be developed to address the problems of exchange loss. Article 4 of the Annex
to the proposed European Convention on Foreign Money Liabilities, provides for re-
covery of exchange loss. See MANN, supra note 6, at 579.
76 9 Ex. 341 (1854). The case stated two rules, or prongs, for contract damages.
The first rule covered damages "ordinarily flowing" from the breach. The second cov-
ered damages based on particular needs of which the breaching party had been made
aware at the time of contracting. The second rule apparently was originally considered
as based on a "tacit agreement." But in the United States today, this concept appears to
have been largely abandoned in favor of a "reason to know" approach. See U.C.C. § 2-
715 and comment 2 (1987). A prior draft of the Act adopted this approach, but omitted
as unnecessary the damages limit placed by the U.C.C., namely, that "which could not
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." Id. § 2-715(2)(a). The normal desire
of a merchant is to minimize what is at risk in litigation. The normal rules as to
minimizing damages and the complexity of proof as to appropriate future contracts or
options lead to the desirability of the omission. But the decision was made to leave the
whole matter to the rules of the conflict of laws.
7 [1981] 1 N.Z.L.R. 361. See also GOODE, supra note 14, at 143 (citing C.E.F.
Rickett, Contract Damages for Exchange Losses, a New Zealand Development, [1982]
L.M.C.L.Q. 566).
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their home currency. As the pound sterling declined with respect to the
New Zealand dollar after the breach date, the trial court awarded not
only prejudgment interest for the loss of use of money,78 but also the
exchange loss. This was calculated by subtracting the New Zealand
dollars eventually obtained from the number of New Zealand dollars
that would have been obtained had the sterling been paid when due.
The significance of the case appears to be that the price was paya-
ble in the home money of the buyer and the exchange loss was suffered
in the home money of the seller. The trouble with a foreseeability test
is that some things are more foreseeable than others. For example, it is
foreseeable that a seller of agricultural products would, on the date
payment is due, transfer receipts into the home money. In contrast, the
foreseeability of the need for an international corporation to transfer
money of a country in which it has substantial operations to money of
the country of its home office is more remote, and may create issues for
the triers of fact.
The second interpretation of Hadley v. Baxendale involves the
money of a third country and is illustrated by Ozalid Group (Export),
Ltd. v. African Continental Bank, Ltd.79 That case involved an En-
glish seller, a Nigerian buyer, and a sale of machinery and equipment
priced in United States dollars for which the defendant bank had issued
its letter of credit. The payment was delayed. Ozalid Group (Export)
Ltd. engaged in international trade and kept bank accounts in United
States dollars in England. As the currency control laws of the United
Kingdom required that "excess" dollars 0 be converted to sterling, Mr.
Justice Donaldson ruled that the defendants "knew or should have
known" of the transfer practices of the sellers. Apparently, the Bank of
England's instructions required the exchange of excess dollars to be
made at the end of the month. But, as the dollar was falling relative to
the pound sterling, Mr. Justice Donaldson accepted a calculation of the
exchange loss which allowed for the recovery of the difference between
78 Where two countries are involved, it is of considerable significance to determine
whether the function of prejudgment interest is to compensate a successful plaintiff for
the loss of use of money using the rate of plaintiff's country, or to wrest from an
unsuccessful defendant his gains from retention of payment, in which case the rate used
should be that of the defendant's country.
19 [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 231. Mr. Justice Donaldson indicated that the defendant
had advanced no excuse for delaying payment on the letter of credit from October 5,
1977 to December 12, 1977.
so The exchange control laws permitted plaintiffs to have "foreign currency hold
accounts," but they were obliged to sell "excess dollars" not later than the last working
day of the month in exchange for sterling. The instructions of the Bank of England
defined the term "excess dollars" as: "Funds in the account except those needed to
make payments known to be due in the currency of the account within the ensuing
month." [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 233.
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the pounds recoverable on the contractual due date and those recover-
able on the date of the actual payment."' Additionally, the calculation
included the interest on the full recovery between the two dates, and on
the exchange loss thereafter until the date of judgment.8 2 Two elements
of incidental damages were also recovered. 3 As in Isaac Naylor, the
conversion was to the recipient's home currency, and foreseeability was
enhanced by the legally required conversions.8 4 The third interpretation
of Hadley v. Baxendale can be read as casting considerable doubt on
the other two, or it can be interpreted narrowly." The case illustrating
this scenario should be carefully analyzed, as the court issuing the opin-
ion was the House of Lords. The case, President of India v. Lips Mar-
itime Corp.,"8 involved a claim of demurrage by Greek ship owners
"i Id. at 234. The exchange rates for those days were used instead of the last day
of the month as it was felt to be foreseeable that, in view of the decline of the dollar
with respect to sterling, plaintiffs would not have waited until the end of the month to
convert. Id. at 233.
"' Interest was based on 1% above the rough average Minimum Bank Lending
Rate for the period. The case is a bit unusual as plaintiff had been paid the full num-
ber of dollars before the suit was instituted; but the exchange loss was 2,987.17 pounds
sterling. Id. at 234.
'" The two items of incidental damages were a fee paid to plaintiff's bank for
urging payment, and a fee paid to plaintiff's solicitors. Id.
" Mr. Justice Donaldson rather cavalierly assumed that the entire payment
would be converted rather than finding what percentage of the account was kept in
dollars and not converted and awarding the exchange loss on the remaining percentage.
The defendants, however, had submitted no oral evidence. The learned judge fixed the
damages from "notional sales." Id. at 233.
" See, e.g., Mann, Recovering Currency Exchange Losses, 104 LAw. Q. Rlv. 3
(1988).
16 [19871 3 W.L.R. 572. The prior course of the case bears significantly on the
result. Defendants had admitted and paid substantial demurrage. The arbitration um-
pire found that an additional four days and one hour were due, or $24,250. The pound,
at the bill of lading date (july 8, 1980) was at $2.37, which is equivalent to 10,232
pounds sterling. The arbitrator also found that the Greek ship owner used United
States dollar accounts. Hence, to repurchase the $24,250 on subsequent dates, the ship
owners would need:
Pounds at Market
Bill of Lading Date $2.37 = one pound 10,232
Award 2/22/83 $1.54 = one pound 15,746
Q.B. Final 4/3/85 $1.21 = one pound 20,209
H.L. 7/29/87 $1.60 = one pound 15,156
The arbitrator did not specify on which of the prongs of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex.
341 (1854), his award rested. The first prong deals with "general damages"; the second
prong discusses "special damages." See supra note 76. According to Mr. Justice
Staughton, the latter includes circumstances communicated at the time of contracting.
The case was remanded to the umpire to determine which prong applied.
The arbitrator in Lips found that businessmen generally anticipated a decline in
sterling with respect to the dollar; every ship owner knew that the government of India
would insist on the clause; there would be a profitable change to the benefit of the
charterer due to the inevitable delay of "three, four, or five months" before payment of
demurrage would be made; and, the owners knew of this risk and accepted it as part of
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from the charterer of the vessel. Demurrage was fixed in the charter-
party at $6,000 a day payable in British external sterling in London.
Freight was also payable in British external sterling in London at the
exchange rate ruling on the date of the bill of lading. Additionally,
clause 30 of the charter provided that the exchange rate so determined
would "also apply to other related payments/settlements including de-
murrage/despatch settlements under this charterparty.... ."I'
In Lips there was a service contract with a money of account de-
termining the quantity of the money of payment for "discharge port
demurrage" ' at an exchange rate fixed as of a date that was a full
voyage time before the payment date. In fact, the expected payment due
date found by the umpire in arbitration was five months and three days
after July 8, 1980, the bill of lading date. 9 But the arbitration finding
as to the final amount of demurrage was not made until February 22,
1983.90 An appeal was allowed on July 30, 1984, but referred the mat-
the deal. The umpire also found that the Greek ship owners operated in dollars and
that this was a general practice of ship owners. Hence, the charterers "knew or should
have known" of the practice. His final finding was:
Accordingly, I find that loss by the devaluation of sterling was something
which was "reasonably foreseeable" by, or "within actual or assumed con-
templation" of, the parties, and that such loss was "liable to result" or "a
real danger," if payment at the appropriate time was not made. This case
in my view comes within the second rule in Hadley v. Baxendale.
[1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 180, 186.
The findings were made sometime after Mr. Justice Lloyd's remand on July 30,
1984. On remand, Mr. Justice Lloyd cited La Pintada, a case which had been decided
on May 24, 1984 and made the same statement about the second prong of Hadley as
that of Mr. Justice Lloyd. [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 182. Mr. Justice Staughton, how-
ever, thought that what the charterers knew or should have known still had to be com-
municated to them by the ship owners in order to satisfy the second prong of Hadley.
Hence, he believed the award was wrong in law, and, under the first prong of Hadley,
only interest could be recovered. [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 188.
17 President of India v. Lips Maritime Corp., [1987] 3 W.L.R. 572, 575.
88 All attorneys involved in the case "accepted" that the reasonable time for pay-
ment of demurrage or settlement of "despatch" (a reduction in charter-hire for early
departure) was two months after the departure from the port on October 11, 1980, or
December 11, 1980. [19851 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 183.
89 The time period includes two months' grace period which was accepted by all
counsel. Justice Staughton did not discuss a possible argument that the fixed exchange
rate was not intended to apply beyond the date accepted by counsel as the date payment
should have been made. Regarding clause 30, he noted that it "was no doubt directed at
punctual payment rather than late payment, it is in my judgment a case where the
contract provides, as Lord Wilberforce said, an answer to the currency problem." Id. at
188.
90 90 With respect to using the terms of clause 30, two years, seven months and
fifteen days after July 8, 1980, the arbitrator ruled in finding no. 15: "The provisions
of clause 30 apply, for better or for worse, where the contract is correctly performed;
but they do not apply to a breach. I have already found that the charterers were in
bieach in not making payment timeously." [19871 3 W.L.R. at 575.
This clause of the findings is not mentioned in the Queen's Bench opinions, but
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ter back to the umpire to determine which prong of Hadley v. Bax-
endale supported the award of the exchange loss.91 On April 3, 1985,
Mr. Justice Staughton reviewed the further findings and disallowed the
exchange loss. The umpire had erroneously chosen the second prong of
Hadley, as he had to find "any special fact communicated by the own-
ers to the charterer which would not have been apparent to any other
businessman in the same trade.""2 Then, with the matter resting on the
first prong of Hadley, the court was faced with Lord Brandon of Oak-
brook's prior decision that damages for a late payment of money are
not recoverable if they are general damages within the first prong of
Hadley, but may be recoverable under the second prong."
In the Lips case, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook cited the Isaac Nay-
lor case with apparent approval, but only in reference to the late pay-
ment of a debt. He concluded that demurrage was not a debt but dam-
ages, for which the only remedy was "the discretionary award of
interest pursuant to statute."' 94 He then ruled that the award of demur-
was apparently accepted by the Court of Appeal. [1987] 2 W.L.R. 906, 914. It was
also mentioned by Lord Brandon of Oakbrook in his speech before the House of Lords.
He said: "It appears to me that this passage involves some confusion of thought."
[1987] 3 W.L.R. 572, 577. The same comment applies to his Lordship's finding that
non-payment of demurrage was not a breach and to his reasons for not limiting the
clause to prompt payment. With respect to the latter, he said: "If clause 30 did not
apply to determine the rate of exchange applicable in the case of a late-payment, there
was no provision for conversion in that case at all." Id.
The above raises the question of what role his Lordship assigns to the market
rates when the contract has no applicable conversion rate.
91 [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 180, 183. For a description of the two prongs of Hadley
v. Baxendale, see supra note 76.
:2 Id. at 186.
1 La Pintada Compania Navigacion, S.A. v. The President of India, [1985] A.C.
104, [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 9. In that case, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook said:
In my opinion the ratio decidendi of Wadsworth v. Lyndall [1981] 1
W.L.R. 598 that the London, Chatham and Dover Railway case [1893]
A.C. 429 applied only to claims for interest by way of general damages,
and did not extend to claims for special damages, in the sense in which it
is clear that Lord Justice Brightman was using those two expressions, was
correct and should be approved by your Lordships. On the assumption
that your Lordships give such approval the effect will be to reduce consid-
erably the scope of the London, Chatham and Dover Railway case by
comparison with what it had in general previously been understood to be.
[1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 21.
[1987] 3 W.L.R. 572, 580. The exact language is:
Once it is recognised that a claim for demurrage sounds in damages rather
than in debt, it becomes apparent that the two concepts, first, of a contrac-
tual date for the payment of such damages [i.e., the after two months used
by the umpire], and secondly, of a claim for damages for breach of con-
tract in not paying them by such date, have no basis in law. As I said
earlier an owner's cause of action for demurrage, being one for damages,
albeit liquidated damages, accrues de die in diem from the moment when
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rage was covered by the conversion rate expressed in the contract, no
matter how long after its due date the award was rendered.95
Unlike the first two cases, Isaac Naylor & Sons and Ozalid
Group, the money of payment in Lips was not the home money of
either party. The money of account, which was also the money in
which the exchange loss was felt, was a foreign money used by the
plaintiff to operate its business. The decision of the House of Lords,
while reinstating the judgment of the Queen's Bench, specifically dis-
claimed approval of its reasoning. Hence, the decision can be construed
to rest entirely on the interpretation of clause 30 in the charterparty
specifying an exchange rate but no payment date.96
With respect to these three cases, the prior draft rested decisions
relating to exchange losses in a late payment conversion on a court's
conclusion as to what the payor knew or should have known under the
foreseeability test. The Act addresses this problem only in a comment,
since the issue is to be covered by the rules of the conflict of laws of the
forum court. The comment indicates that there is no prohibition against
an award for exchange losses.9" There are two presumptions in the Act,
the interpretation of which may be applicable only if the substantive
law is covered by the law of the forum. One is that, when a contract
specifies that the exchange rates are those prevailing at a date before
default, it is presumed that the parties intended for that rate apply only
to payments made during a reasonable period after default, not to ex-
ceed thirty days. The second presumption is that, where no specific
the ship is detained beyond the stipulated lay days. There is no such thing
as a cause of action in damages for late payment of damages. The only
remedy which the law affords for delay in paying damages is the discre-
tionary award of interest pursuant to statute.
It is to be sincerely hoped that the above language will not be interpreted as precluding
variation of the stated rule by contract or usage of trade, and that his Lordship's state-
ment that a failure to pay demurrage on time was not a breach of the charterparty can
be avoided by appropriate drafting. The approach to the interpretation of clause 30 by
Lord Mackay of Clashfern [1987] 3 W.L.R. at 582-83 left the way open.
" Interpreting the words "payments/settlements" following "demurrage/des-
patch," Lord Brandon of Oakbrook found that "settlements," as used in two other
clauses in the charterparty included settlement by arbitration. Id. at 582. Lord Mackay
of Clashfern interpreted the same in the context of clause 30. He believed that "pay-
ments" referred to "demurrage" and "settlements" referred to "despatch." According to
Lord Mackay of Clashfern, the latter term applies to the rule that departure in less
time than provided results in a reduction of the charter payments and hence is "settled"
rather than "paid." Id. at 583-84.
" [1987] 3 W.L.R. at 582. See GOODE, supra note 14, at 83 (citing Cook v.
Fowler, 1874 L.R. 7 H.L. 27); see also id. at 82 ("Interest continues to run only for
the period and in the conditions prescribed in the contract. So in the ordinary way a
bond, note or certificate of deposit ceases to carry interest after the specified maturity
date.").
" See the Act § 2 and comment, 13 U.L.A. 26 (Supp. 1990).
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exchange rate is stated but the amount to be paid in one money is
measured by a different money, the recipient of a payment bears the
risk of exchange fluctuations in that different agreed money of account
until payment is made.98 All matters of damages are eliminated from
specific mention in the Act and therefore are left to be determined by
the conflict of laws rules of the forum, or, if applicable, by the forum's
own general rules of damages.
Another approach to the Lips decision is recounted in Lord Bran-
don of Oakbrook's opinion (although he does not ascribe to that ap-
proach). According to that approach, the plaintiffs should have initially
asserted a claim for United States dollars as the money in which the
loss was felt.9" This is rather a severe extension of Lord Wilberforce's
approach in The Despina R and the Folias,100 where the phrase was
used in reference to a conversion made before expenditure and provable
by bank records. In contrast, the Lips situation covers the case of a
delay in payment and an anticipated conversion of money to be received
of which the defendant knew or should have known.10 1 Perhaps the
only difference is the quality of the proof to be offered.
The Act contains a provision which gives the judgment debtor an
option to pay a quantum of dollars calculated at the rate of exchange
prevailing at the conversion date for actual payments.1 02 This is quite
different from using a contractual money of account and fixed exchange
rate to determine the amount of money to be paid at the contractual
due date or to determine the damages for a breach of contract.
This approach was not adopted, however. Instead, the Act takes
" Section 5(a) of the Act provides that where the amount of the money to be paid
is measured by yet another money, the amount to be paid is determined by the rate of
exchange between the two monies prevailing when a payment is made or when a distri-
bution proceeding is begun. Section 5(b) contains a second presumption which limits
fixed quantity exchange rates in contracts to the maturity date of the obligation and a
reasonably short period thereafter. All of the above is, of course, subject to an agree-
ment specifying another result. 13 U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 1990).
9 [1987] 3 W.L.R. 572, 577.
100 [1979] App. Cas. 685, 697 (1978).
101 [1987] 3 W.L.R. 572.
'' Section 7 of the Act merely provides the standard option to pay in equivalent
money of the country where the debt is payable. Professor Goode states: "Where pay-
ment in foreign money is to be made in England the debtor prima fade has the option
of tendering the foreign currency itself or its sterling equivalent." See supra note 14, at
130 (citing Marrache v. Ashton, 1943 App. Gas. 311; Adelaide Elec. Supply Co. v.
Prudential Assurance Co. 1934 App. Gas. 122 (1933); Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. v.
Levin Bros. (Bradford) Ltd., 1977 Q.B. 270 (1976)).
However, usage can rebut the presumption that legal tender can be used. Since a
current exchange rate is used in the Act, the burden on the creditor when dollars in the
correct amount are tendered in an official bank check is nothing more than arranging a
currency transfer with a bank.
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no position on the matter, impliedly leaving the matter to general rules
such as the forum's conflict of laws rules for the general rules of dam-
ages to be applied. In the United States, case law on the issue has not
developed.1"'
3.6.2. Prejudgment and Post-judgment Interest
A second issue of enormous difficulty is the determination of
proper interest rates for any awards of prejudgment and post-judgment
interest. Determining the proper law to apply is very difficult. In addi-
tion, the economists have correctly noted that the interest rates of the
country issuing a currency reflect anticipated fluctuations in exchange
rates. This factor is explicitly accounted for in the price of short-term
futures." 4 However, for short-term futures, economists and bankers use
a market rate of interest which is compounded. 5 In contrast, both in
the United States 06 and in some other countries,107 rates of interest, at
least on judgments, are often fixed statutory rates and, too often, are
unchanging. In England, and in some English-influenced jurisdictions,
although courts have discretion to fix an appropriate interest rate, there
is a prohibition against compounding.10 Since 1970, several states in
the United States, the federal government of the United States, and the
10" No section expressly so provides, hence the usual rules would apply under
section 13 of the Act (Supplementary General Principles of Law) providing for the
application of the principles of law and equity, etc. "unless displaced." 13 U.L.A. 33
(Supp. 1990). In the situations discussed in the text accompanying this note, there is no
displacement.
104 For short-term futures, bankers, as well as economists, compute the price or
discount based on the difference in interest rates. However, they use current short-term
market rates, not the statutorily fixed rates used for both prejudgment and post-judg-
ment interest in legal proceedings. Even in the United States states which have flexible
rates, the percentage chosen is fixed for a given period, often only changing annually.
For example, for the 1989 calendar year, New Jersey used the average rate earned on
its funds for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1988. Thus, rates current from July 1987
to June 1988 influenced the rate for January to December 1989. The result is scarcely
a current yield.
105 See, e.g., Bowles and Whelan, Book Review, 60 CANADIAN B. Rxv. 805
(1982) (reviewing LAW REFO m COMMISSION OF BRITISH COLUmnIA, FOREIGN
MONEY LIABILrms, WORKING PAPER No. 33 (1982)).
.06 Only Colorado and Kentucky allow compounding of interest in all cases. The
United States permits compounding in non-diversity cases. See Marvell, How Should
We Set Interest Rates on Judgments of Appeal?, JUDGES J., 36, 38 (Summer 1988).
Both of these sources found that jurisdictions apply fixed rates, with the exception of
fifteen which use indexed rates.
107 Foreign country information on this point is hard to ascertain, but the availa-
ble information indicates a variance in fixed rates between countries. England uses a
discretionary rate for prejudgment interest and a rate fixed by court rules for post-
judgment interest pursuant to 35A of the Supreme Court Act 1981, as amended by
15(1) of the Administration of Justice Act 1982. GOODE, supra note 14, at 85.
108 See President of India v. Lips Maritime Corp., [1987] 3 W.L.R. 572, 581.
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District of Columbia have made ninety-six legislative changes in the
interest rates on judgments, fifty-five of which occurred between 1979
and 1982.109 Fifteen changes occurred from 1983 to 1987, and most of
these seem to have effected a lowering of the previously increased
rates.'10 Fifteen more recent statutes have adopted variable rates."'
Eleven of these follow the interest rates on issues of United States se-
curities (often adding approximately one percent) while still fixing a
rate for a year, despite changes in the index. Seven of the states with
variable rates use the fifty-two week Treasury bill rate. In four of these
seven states the interest rates change monthly; the remaining three
change annually. But, once the rate is selected, it apparently applies
until the judgment is paid.1
2
Not much has appeared in English about foreign prejudgment and
post-judgment interest rates. What has been found, however, indicates
that rates are considerably lower than those found in most of the state
statutes in the United States. As of January 1988, fixed rates in the
United States varied from a low of 6% in Pennsylvania to a high of
15% in New Mexico.'" In comparison, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many has a statutory rate of 4% on civil cases and 5% on commercial
cases. Similarly, as a general rule, Japan's prejudgment and post-judg-
ment interest rate is 5%."1' Hong Kong applies a rate equal to 1% over
the mean weighted prime rate, as posted by the Hong Kong & Shang-
hai Bank. 1 5 Indonesia has a 6% rate,"" Singapore an 8% rate,1 17 and
the Philippines, 12% running from "judicial demand.""' In the United
States, and in all countries that have made the relevant information
available, a rate for prejudgment and post-judgment interest fixed by
contract will often be used in place of the statutory rate. However,
some jurisdictions place limits on the contract rate. For example, Texas
has a minimum rate of 10%, variable up to 20% if the Treasury bill
rate is over 10%.'19
Many states use the judgment rate or a contract rate expressed to
109 See Marvell, supra note 106, at table 1.
110 Id.
111 Id.
1 Id. at table 3.
119 Id. at table 2.
21, Letter from Professor Fredrich Kilbler, University of Frankfort to Fairfax
Leary (discussing West Germany); Letter from Professor Charles Mooney, University
of Pennsylvania Law School to Fairfax Leary (discussing Japan).
115 Letter from Hugh Verrier, attorney for White & Case (written from Singa-
pore) to Fairfax Leary.
116 Id.
17 Id.
I's Id.
119 Marvell, supra note 106.
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continue beyond maturity in order to calculate prejudgment interest.
Among the states that do not follow this method, there is no set pattern
for determining prejudgment interest. For example, the Alabama post-
judgment rate is 12% or the contract rate, but the prejudgment rate is
8%.2 0 In contrast, Pennsylvania's post-judgment rate is 6% but the
prejudgment rate is 10%, except in special cases. In 1989, Pennsylvania
amended its rules of civil procedure to use the prime rate for dam-
ages."' 1 Also, in many states, prejudgment interest is awarded only for
liquidated amounts or for damages that are an ascertainable sum cer-
tain. The date when prejudgment interest begins to accrue also varies
among the states. Some states calculate them from the date the cause of
action arose, others from thirty days after notice of the claim was given,
and still others from the date of the service of process. Some states pro-
vide that offers of settlement must be made and threaten that penalties
will accrue against the party refusing the offer if litigation continues
and that party does not ultimately recover an amount exceeding the
settlement offer. In Pennsylvania, the recovery must exceed the offer by
at least twenty-five percent. 12 2 Hence, there are a myriad of rules
among the states relating to the proper rate of interest to apply. To
complicate matters, section 144 of the Second Restatement of Conflict
of Laws treats the rates of interest to be allowed as matters of substance
to be determined by the proper law of the case. In contrast, some writ-
ers treat the matter of the rate of interest as a rule of procedure to be
determined by the law of the forum.
1 2
1
110 ALA. CODE § 8-8-1, -10 (1975); see also Burgess Mining and Constr. Corp. v.
Lees, 440 So. 2d 321, 338 (Ala. 1983).
"I1 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 238(a)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1989) (the prime rate
used would be the one listed in the first edition of the Wall Street Journal for that
calendar year, plus one percent, not compounded).
1 2 See Wilson, Bosco, & Malone, Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury,
Wrongful Death and Other Actions, 30 Trial Law. Guide 105 (1986).
113 See CHESHrRE & NORTH, PRiVATE INTERNATioNAL LAW 96-97 (11th ed.
1987) (citing Shell Tankers (UK), Ltd. v. Astro Comino Armadora, S.A., [1981] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 40, 45-47):
The currency of the proper law .... may be different from that of the
currency of account, the currency of the loss and the currency of the forum
.... If the rate of interest is governed by the lexfori, this means that, in
England, the court has a discretion as to the rate and .... prima facie,
interest should be awarded at the rate applicable to the currency of the
judgment. This might not be possible if the proper law of the contract
governed the rate and the proper law had a fixed rate.
See also Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd. (No. 2), 1977 Q.B. 489, [1976] 3
All E.R. 599. This prima facie rule was displaced in Helmsing Schiffahrts Q.m.b.H. &
Co., KG v. Malta Drydocks Corp., [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 444.
Where the interest statute, as in England, confers discretion on the court with
respect to the rate of interest payable on the judgment, the judgment can be awarded in
foreign currency. CHESHIRME & NORTH supra at 100. The decision as to whether dam-
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Section 8(b) of the October 15th, 1988 draft of the Act provided
that contract rates should be followed both for prejudgment interest, if
any, and for post-judgment interest. Additionally, section 8(b) provided
that, in the absence of a contractual rate, the rate used should be the
applicable rate of the jurisdiction whose law governs the case. Pursuant
to that section, post-judgment interest would have been calculated at the
rate of a one-year governmental obligation, or at the rate of the short-
term governmental obligation nearest to one year. When calculating ei-
ther prejudgment or post-judgment interest pursuant to this section,
whether the interest should be simple or compounded would have been
determined by the law of the forum.124
ages can be awarded in a foreign currency is a procedural question. Id. at 102. In
Miliangos, the judge wanted to apply a Swiss interest rate, but the Swiss borrowing
rate incurred by the plaintiff was a compound interest rate and the English statute
prohibited compounding. Justice Brandon ruled that whether interest was recoverable
was a substantive question, while the rate to be used was a procedural matter. See id.
at 97. But state courts in the United States are bound by either fixed rates or by in-
dexed rates using only United States indices.
Note that the rate of interest was treated as procedural by Judge F.J. McGarr in In re
Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978, No. 376,
part 2 of 2, at 317, 322-23 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 1988):
The discussion of prejudgment interest (and post judgment interest, later
treated) begins with the assumption that both are procedural matters to be
governed by the law of the forum.
It has been the position of the court throughout that the determination of
interest rates is a procedural matter and, thus, the suggestion of Amoco
that the court is bound by the French statutory interest rate, is not valid..
• . The rationale of pre-judgment interest has to do with the loss by the
plaintiff of the use of the funds properly claimed as indicated by the ulti-
mate award of the court and the use by the defendant of such funds when,
from the date of the events causing liability, they should have belonged to
the plaintiffs....
In the determination of the appropriate percentage rate of interest to
be applied as heretofore described, the court, in its discretion, has a range
of choices. Plaintiffs suggest the prime rate at the applicable periods; the
defendant suggests the Illinois statutory rate of five percent.
This court notes recent legislation on the subject of post-judgment
interest applicable in federal courts, and has utilized the same rule both
for pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest.
Id. at 322-23. In Amoco, the judge applied "the rate of 7.22% compounded annually."
Id. at 324. Amoco's counsel has orally informed the authors that the difference between
the prime rate suggested by France and the compounded rate awarded was approxi-
mately one-half of one percent of the award before interest was added.
"14 Preliminary draft of October 18, 1988 § 8, now replaced by a reference to the
conflict of laws rules. The Act § 9(a), 13 U.L.A. 30 (Supp. 1990). If those rules select
the law of the forum, then the interest rules of the forum will apply. However, Judge
Bristow, in Miliangos, [19771 3 All E.R. at 603, notes that DICEY & MORSs, Tm
CONFLiaT OF LAWS 866 n.166 (9th ed. 1973) states:
[Tihe liability to pay interest, and the rate of interest payable in respect of
a debt, e.g. in respect of a loan, is determined by the proper law of the
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In the absence of satisfactory proof of the foreign law, the draft
attempted, in the interest of uniformity, to provide the same rule for
calculating prejudgment and post-judgment interest as that specified in
the 1988 federal statute.1" 5 This approach seemed to satisfy few, how-
ever. The economists, by showing that interest rates varied with ex-
pected fluctuations in exchange rates, seemed to calculate interest by
using the market rates for the country corresponding to the money in
which the judgment was to be entered, compounded annually.12 A ref-
erence to post-judgment interest rates under the law of the country is-
suing the money of the claim is feasible in unitary countries. This is
not possible in federal states such as Canada or Australia, or, for that
matter, in the United States of America, because the money is federal
and the judgment interest rates are matters of state or provincial law.
The Act states that prejudgment interest should be determined in
accordance with the forum's principles of the conflict of laws.1 27 Al-
though the economists would probably not support this, many others
contract under which the debt is incurred, e.g., by the proper law of the
contract under which the loan was made. The editors have now come to
the conclusion that this rule should also apply to interest awarded by the
court by way of damages, that is to achieve restitutio ad integrum where a
contract has been broken which did not of itself provide for interest to be
payable in case of a breach. Previously it had been thought by the editors
that the award of such damages, being a matter of procedure, would be
governed by the lexfori.
Id. Yet, under the English procedure, Judge Bristow found Swiss interest rates to be
appropriate.
5 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part that:
(a) Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judg-
ment, at a rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (as determined
by the Secretary of the Treasury) of the average accepted auction price for
the last auction of fifty-two week United States Treasury bills settled im-
mediately prior to the date of the judgment .... (b) Interest .... shall be
compounded annually.
126 See generally Bowles & Whelan, supra note 105.
127 Section 9 of the Act reads as follows:
(a) With respect to a foreign-money claim, recovery of pre-judgment
or pre-award interest and the rate of interest to be applied in the action or
distribution proceeding, except as provided in subsection (b), are matters
of the substantive law governing the right to recovery under the conflict-
of-laws rules of this State.
(b) The court or arbitrator shall increase or decrease the amount of
pre-judgment or pre-award interest otherwise payable in a judgment or
award in foreign-money to the extent required by the law of this State
governing a failure to make or accept an offer of settlement or offer of
judgment, or conduct by a party or its attorney causing undue delay or
expense.
(c) A judgment or award on a foreign-money claim bears interest at
the rate applicable to judgments of this State.
13 U.L.A. 30 (Supp. 1990).
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would. Those not advocating for this position thought it would enhance
the chances of legislative enactment of the Act. The prejudgment and
post-judgment interest problem would thus remain for a later uniform
law addressed only to these issues.
3.7. Miscellaneous Issues
The Act also contains provisions detailing the treatment of judg-
ments of other jurisdictions and the effect of currency revalorizations.
Moreover, the Act provides for the enforcement of judgments of sister
states exactly as entered in the sister states, even if a foreign-money
claim is involved.128
The effect of currency revalorizations, where the issuing govern-
ment provides a rate of exchange between the new and the old, is cov-
ered in section 12.129 The Act attempted to incorporate a section con-
trolling cases of complete repudiation, but the drafting committee
decided to omit such a section, as in practically all instances the matter
will be handled through diplomatic channels or by the use of the equity
powers of the court.Y30
4. THE TRUE REASON FOR THE REMEDY
The true reason for the remedy13 1 is the basic policy underlying
Anglo-American law: The injured or aggrieved party should be placed
in the position that the party would have been in had the injury not
been sustained or had the contract been fully performed." 2 The tort
victim should be reimbursed for injuries in the money in which the
injury was actually sustained. Even if repairs or personal medical ex-
1' See § 10 of the Act. 13 U.L.A. 31 (Supp. 1990). Subsections (a) and (b) cover
the entry of truly foreign judgments. With respect to sister states, the rule of subsection
(c) is thought to be required by the "full faith and credit" clause of the United States
Constitution. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
"" The Act § 12, 13 U.L.A. 32 (Supp. 1990). Mann calls it a "recurrent link-
ing." See supra note 6, at 44 n.92 (quoting KNAPP, STATE THEORY OF MONEY 21,
(Lucas & Bonar trans. 1924)).
130 In some cases, courts have determined that a particular party had assumed the
particular risk of money devaluations. See, e.g., Ngoc Quang Trinh v. Citibank, N.A.,
850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1988) (risk assumed by Vietnamese depositor); see also Shang-
hai Power Co. v. Delaware Trust Co., 316 A.2d 589 (Del. Ch. 1974), affd in part
and rev'd in part sub nom. Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624 (Del. 1988)
(debenture holder to assume risk of currency repudiation under the trust indenture, but
preferred stockholder given a share in settlement obtained through diplomatic negotia-
tions. Power company was a Delaware corporation. A common stockholder was held
not to be entitled to the entire settlement).
1 See supra notes 40-130 and accompanying text.
12 This is often termed the principle of restitutio in integrum. BLAcK's LAW
DICTONARY 1313 (6th ed. 1990).
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penses were originally paid in a particular money, if it can be shown
that a different money had been used to obtain the particular money
used for payment, it is that different money that is considered the
proper money of the claim in which the judgment should be entered.'3 8
For example, suppose two Greek-owned ships collided off the port of
Shanghai and the ship not at fault obtained emergency repairs in
Shanghai, further repairs in Tokyo, and final repairs in San Francisco.
Three moneys were used to pay for the repairs-Chinese yuan, Japa-
nese yen, and United States dollars-but the managers in each case
obtained the funds used from a managerial bank account in Swiss
francs located in Zurich. Thus, the money of the claim would be Swiss
francs in order to reimburse the Zurich bank account for the money
spent, including the exchange fees incurred.
1 3 '
The first United States reported case proposing a foreign-money
judgment was the decision entered on January 11, 1988 by Judge
Frank J. McGarr in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois.1" 5 The case involved claims for compensation by
French claimants for damage done by oil spilled when the tanker
"Amoco Cadiz" was breached on rocks off the coast of France. The
recoverable damages exceeded 250,000,000 French francs with prejudg-
ment interest from December 31, 1979. The opinion stated: "In sum-
mary, the judgment is in francs and Amoco must pay it in francs." '
The core of the judge's reasoning was as follows:
In ordinary circumstance, the court would regard francs and
dollars as merely separate measures of a single value and the
judgment in francs should be translatable into dollars and a
judgment in dollars into francs, without loss or fiscal conse-
quence to either party. The dramatic recent variance in the
.exchange rate interjects an unfortunate element into this
... Actually, the form of judgment suggested by § 7 of the Act gives the judgment
debtor the option of paying in the specified foreign currency or in a number of dollars
that, on the banking day before the day of payment, would purchase the requisite
quantity of the specified foreign money, as increased by the specified rate of judgment
interest. 13 U.L.A. 29 (Supp. 1990).
1" The facts are taken from The Despina R, [1979] App. Cas. 685, except that
Swiss francs are substituted for the source of the money used to buy the other moneys.
123 In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of France on March 16,
1978, No. 376, part 2 of 2 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 11, 1988). A minor part of the judgment was
entered in pounds sterling. Damages awarded totalled 252,837,825.12 French francs.
Prejudgment interest was awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988) at 7.22% in-
terest compounded annually from December 31, 1979. Id. at 323-24. On the day of the
award, this amount plus interest equaled approximately $85,000,000. The award was
later increased to some extent after post-trial motions. As of this writing, judgment has
not been formally entered.
138 Id. at 311.
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computation, with which the court must deal.
It is the conclusion of the court that France suffered its loss
in francs, paid its damage claims in francs, proved its case in
francs, and has a judgment in francs, however and at
whatever expense is required to obtain francs . .. In sum-
mary, the judgment is in francs and Amoco must pay it in
francs.
1 3 7
The judge's statement about a single value expressible in either United
States dollars or French francs without fiscal consequences is correct at
any given instant in time. But, given the time-lags between the date of
expenditure, the date of the determination of damages, and the date of
actual payment, the single value existing on an expenditure date can
become two very different values at the later dates.13 " The issue is:
Which party should bear the risks of the external fluctuations in ex-
change values in a currency foreign to one of the parties (since the
nominalistic principle of each money prevents consideration of internal
changes in the value of domestic money)?"39 In cases sounding in tort,
the money in which the loss was ultimately felt should be the determin-
ing factor. Contract cases are more complicated as it must first be de-
termined which party (either by express contract terms, by course of
dealing, or by trade usage) has assumed the risk of changes in the ex-
ternal value of the money.1 40 The determination of which party should
bear the risk of external fluctuations in exchange values yields what the
Act calls the "money of the claim.
14 1
2S7 Id. at 309-11.
"s Compare the fluctuations in the value of the pound against those of the dollar
noted in The President of India v. Lips Maritime Corp., [1987] 3 W.L.R. 572. The
demurrage due was $24,250 to be converted to pounds on the bill of lading date ($2.37
to the pound). Id. at 575. The value of the award calculated on the date the voyage
started was 10,237.07 pounds. Id. at 576. The judgment creditor operated in dollars,
and planned to convert all payments to dollars upon receipt. At the date of the award,
10,237.07 pounds would only buy $15,854.98, a shortfall of $8,395. On the date of the
decision of the Queen's Bench, 10,237.07 pounds would only buy $12,588.14, a
shortfall of almost 50%.
I" See MANN, supra note 6, chs. IV, V & VI, at 80-175. The nominalistic prin-
cipal has been questioned, however. See, e.g., id. at ch. VI ("Methods of Excluding the
Effects of Nominalism"); see also Hammond, Compensation for the Lost Value of
Money: A Canadian Proposal, 99 LAW Q. REv. 68 (1983); Wallace, Inflation and
Assessment of Construction Cost Damages, 98 LAw Q. REv. 406 (1982).
For a discussion of the nominalistic principle, see supra notes 24-25 and accompa-
nying text.
140 See supra note 130.
141 The solution to the issue lies in determining how much of claimant's home
currency would be just compensation for the claimant, and for how long defendant, by
agreeing to pay in a foreign money, should be held to assume the exchange risk of a
1991]
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Freedom of contract should permit the parties to assign these risks
among themselves by contract. This can be done with clarity and, if so,
should be accepted. The money risk can be assumed by one party up to
a specified point in time, and then passed to another party. Again, if
clearly done, the result should be judicially accepted. Where a payment
is to be made, or a loss is suffered in a particular money, the nominalis-
tic principle should be applied to that money, insofar as all involved
parties are concerned with such a loss or payment. However, where
payment is made in one money but the quantum of that money is to be
measured by another money, the Act provides rebuttable presumptions
as to the intent of the parties. 4"
The Act should be construed to suppress the mischiefs of overcom-
pensation and undercompensation. This can be done if the courts will
implement the true commercial purpose of the parties to the transac-
tion, guided by the trade usage, course of dealing, and the presumptions
in the Act.
currency foreign to that defendant. It is possible that the risk periods might differ in
tort cases from the risk periods in contract cases. This difference is not specifically
stated in the Act, but could be observed when evaluating the evidence necessary to rebut
the presumptions in § 5 of the Act. See the Act § 5, 13 U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 1990).
141 Section 4(a) of the Act provides that the money agreed upon as a payment is
the money of the claim for that payment only. Section 4(b) provides for the application
of the money 1) used in regular dealings; 2) used by trade usage or common practice; or
3) in which the loss is felt, whichever is appropriate in the circumstances before the
court. 13 U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 1990).
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